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Translation
y/ he Babylonians were the first to equate two gods by defining their 
common functional definition or cosmic manifestation.1 We may 
call this method “theological onomasiology.” By onomasiology is meant 
a method that starts from the referent and asks for the word, in oppo­
sition to semasiology, which starts from the word and asks for its mean­
ing. Onomasiology is by definition cross-cultural and interlingual. Its aim 
is to find out how a given unit of meaning is expressed in different lan­
guages.
The Babylonians very naturally developed their “theological onoma­
siology” in the context of their general diglossia. Their constant concern 
for correlating Sumerian and Akkadian words brought them to extend this 
method into fields outside that of lexicography proper. But as long as this 
search for theological equations and equivalents was confined to the two 
languages, Sumerian and Akkadian, one could argue that it remained 
within the frame of a common religious culture. The translation here op­
erates translingually but not transculturally. In the late Bronze Age, how­
ever, in the Cassite period, the lists are extended to include languages spo­
ken by foreign peoples. There is an “explanatory list of gods” that gives 
divine names in Amoritic, Hurritic, Elamic, and Cassitic as well as Su­
merian and Akkadian.2 There are even lists translating theophorous proper 
names of persons.3
Among the lists from the private archives of Ugarit, a city-state on the 
northern Syrian coast, are quadrilingual vocabularies that contain Sumer­
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ian, Akkadian, Hurritic (an Indo-European language), and Ugaritic (a 
west Semitic language). Here, the translation concerns three fundamen­
tally different religious cultures and consequentially meets with serious dif­
ficulties.4 Sumero-Babylonian Anum (the god of heaven) is no problem: it 
is rendered in Ugaritic by shamuma (heaven). But for Antum, his wife, 
there is no linguistic equivalent in Ugaritic. It is obviously impossible to 
invent a feminine form of shamuma. Therefore a theological equivalent is 
found in the form of Tamatum (sea) which in Ugaritic mythology may act 
as a feminine partner of heaven. The sun god, utu in Sumerian, Shamash 
in Akkadian, Shimigi in Hurritic, is masculine; his feminine counterpart 
is called Aia in Sumerian and Ejan in Hurritic. But the Ugaritic Shapshu, 
notwithstanding its etymological identity with Akkadian shamshu, is a 
feminine deity, for whom there has to be found a masculine counterpart. 
Again, this problem requires a theological solution. Thus, the god Kothar, 
the god of craftsmen and artisans, appears as a translation of the goddess 
Aia!
In these cases, there can be no doubt that the practice of translating 
divine names was applied to very different cultures and religions. The con­
viction that these foreign peoples worshiped the same gods is far from triv­
ial and self-evident. On the contrary, this insight must be reckoned among 
the major cultural achievements of the ancient world. One of the main in­
centives for tolerance toward foreign religions can be identified in the field 
of international law and the practice of forming treaties with other states 
and peoples. This, too, seems a specialty of Mesopotamian culture. The 
first treaties were formed between the Sumerian city-states of the third mil- 
lenium b.c.e. With the rise of Ebla in northern Syria and with the Sargonid 
conquests this practice soon extended far into the west, involving states 
outside the cultural horizon of Mesopotamia. The Hittites, in the middle 
of the second millenium, inherited this legal culture from the Babylonians 
and developed new and much more elaborate forms of international con­
tract.5 The treaties they formed with their vassals had to be sealed by sol­
emn oaths invoking gods of both parties. The list of these gods conven­
tionally closes the treaty. They had necessarily to be equivalent as to their 
function and in particular to their rank. Intercultural theology thus became 
a concern of international law. It seems to me probable that the interest in 
translations and equations for gods of different religions arose in the con­
text of foreign policy. We are here dealing with the incipient stages of “im­
perial translation” destined to reach all the politically dependent states, 
tribes, and nations. Later, in the age of the great empires, official multilin­
gualism becomes a typical phenomenon.6 The book of Esther tells us how 
in the Persian empire royal commandments were sent to every province in
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its own script and to every people in its own language. A similar practice 
seems already to be attested for the Assyrian empire. In this context belong 
the many bi- and trilingual royal decrees from Persia, Anatolia, and Egypt. 
Even the Buddhist king Asoka—roughly a contemporary of the Egyptian 
Manetho, the Babylonian Berossos, and the translators of the Hebrew Bi­
ble known as the Septuagint—published his edicts in Sanskrit, Aramaic, 
and Greek.7
During the last three millenia b.c.e., religion appears to have been the 
promoter of intercultural translatability. The argument for this function 
runs as follows: peoples, cultures, and political systems may be sharply dif­
ferent. But as long as they have a religion and worship some definite and 
identifiable gods, they are comparable and contactable because these gods 
must necessarily be the same as those worshiped by other peoples under 
different names. The names, iconographies, and rites—in short, the cul­
tures—differ, but the gods are the same. In the realm of culture, religion 
appears as a principle counteracting the effects of what Erik H. Erikson 
called “pseudo-speciation.” Erikson coined this term to describe the for­
mation of artificial subgroups within the same biological species.8 In the 
human world, pseudo-speciation is the effect of cultural differentiation. 
The formation of cultural specificity and identity necessarily produces dif­
ference and otherness vis-a-vis other groups. This can result in the elabo­
ration of absolute strangeness, isolation, avoidance, and even abomina­
tion. Among the Papuas in the highlands of New Guinea where commu­
nication is geographically difficult, this process has led, over some 50,000 
years, to the formation of more than 700 different languages.9 Here, under 
laboratory conditions, the forces of pseudo-speciation could operate rel­
atively undisturbed. Normally they are checked by other factors promoting 
communication and translation. The most important among them seems 
to be commerce, that is, cross-tribal, cross-national, and cross-cultural 
economy. If we look for regions in which these factors were most operative 
in prehistory and antiquity we must think of the Near Eastern commercial 
networks which already in the fourth millenium b.c.e. extended east to the 
Indus valley and west to Egypt and Anatolia. Along the lines and on the 
backbone, so to speak, of these early commercial contacts, political and 
cultural entities crystallized in the third and second millenia, very much 
according to the principles of pseudo-speciation which, however, were al­
ways counterbalanced by cultures of translation.
The profession of interpreter is attested in Sumerian texts from Abu 
Salabih as early as the middle of the third millenium b.c.e.10 The term eme- 
bal, meaning something like “speech changer,” designates a man able to 
change from one language into another. The Babylonian and Assyrian
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equivalent of the Sumerican eme-bal is targumannum (interpreter), a word 
that survives not only in the Aramaic targum (translation), but also in the 
Turkish dragoman, turguman, and so on, that by metathesis eventually led 
to the German form dolmetsch (interpreter).11 In Egypt, too, interpreters 
appear as early as the Old Kingdom. The nomarchs of Elephantine, the 
southernmost province of Egypt, acting as caravan leaders for the African 
trade, bore the title “chief of interpreters.” Contacts with neighboring and 
even more remote tribes were always supported by at least an attempt at 
verbal communication.12
The practice of translating foreign panthea has to be seen in the context 
of this general emergence of a common world with integrated networks of 
commercial, political, and cultural communication. This common world 
extended from Egypt to the Near and Middle East and westward to the 
shores of the Atlantic.13 I am not arguing that this process of intensified 
interrelation and unification was a particularly peaceful one—quite the 
contrary. What might have begun as occasional raids and feuds developed 
into larger forms of organized warfare. We are not speaking here of peace­
ful coexistence. But even war has—in this particular context—to be reck­
oned among the factors of geopolitical unification promoting the idea of 
an oikoumene where all peoples are interconnected in a common history, 
an idea already expressed by the Greek historian Polybius.14 And the idea 
of universal peace reigning in that oikoumene developed along with this 
process, leading to the efforts at imperialistic pacification known as pax 
ramessidica and pax salomonica and ultimately culminating in the pax ro- 
mana.
First the conviction of the ultimate identity of the culturally diversified 
gods, then the belief in a supreme being beyond or above all ethnic deities 
formed the spiritual complement to this process of geopolitical unification. 
Polytheistic religion” functioned as a paradigm of how living in a common 
world was conceivable and communicable. The complete translatability of 
gods founded a consciousness of dealing with basically the same species in 
spite of all other kinds of cultural alterity.
Conversion
Energeia: Language in Its Magical Function
This interpretation of religion as a principle counteracting the factors of 
cultural pseudo-speciation seems rather paradoxical, for religion is gen­
erally held to be the most forceful promoter and expression of cultural 
identity, unity, and specificity. This needs no further elaboration.16 Assim­
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ilation, the giving up of a traditional cultural identity in favor of a domi­
nating culture, is necessarily accompanied by religious conversion, and re­
ligion is universally recognized as the strongest bastion against assimila­
tion. Movements of resistance against political and cultural domination, 
oppression, and exploitation universally assume the form of religious 
movements.17 Jewish history provides the model for these movements of 
liberation, and the Exodus story has been shown to be more or less uni­
versally adopted wherever people have revolted against an oppressive sys­
tem.18
This is true, but it applies to specific political and cultural conditions 
which might be subsumed under the general term of “minority condi­
tions.” Minority conditions arise where a hegemonic culture dominates 
and threatens to swallow up a culturally and ethnically distinct group. 
Here we are dealing with what may be interpreted as an “immune reac­
tion” of the cultural system, a tendency to build up a deliberate “counter­
identity” against the dominating system.19 The cultural system is intensi­
fied in terms of counterdistinctivity.20 This mechanism may be called 
second-degree pseudo-speciation, to be distinguished from normal 
pseudo-speciation, which occurs always and everywhere. Second-degree 
or counterdistinctive pseudo-speciation, however, occurs mostly under 
minority conditions.21 Identity then turns normative, based on “normative 
self-definition.”22 It is typically under these conditions of resistance to po­
litical and cultural domination that religions of a new type emerge which 
I would like to call “second-degree” or “secondary” religions. These reli­
gions defy translatability. They are entered via conversion and left via 
apostasy.23
I shall not recapitulate Jewish history here, which is a sequence of typ­
ical minority situations, starting with Abraham in Ur and Moses in Egypt 
and continuing via less mythical events such as the Babylonian exile, the 
situation of Judaea under the Persians, the Ptolemies, the Seleucids, and 
the Romans, through the various diaspora places from Alexandria to Cer- 
novic (the historical exception, of course, being the modern state of Is­
rael).24 The Jewish paradigm is the most ancient and the most typical; per­
haps it is also the model and origin of all or most other cases. Egypt is a 
far less conspicuous case, but also far less known. I shall therefore con­
centrate on the Egyptian example in showing how religion can work in the 
direction of promoting untranslatability.
Egypt entered into minority conditions only after the Macedonian con­
quest. The Libyan and Ethiopian conquerors had adopted the Egyptian 
culture rather than imposing their own. Even the Persians did not really
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impose their culture on the Egyptians because there were too few immi­
grants from Persia to form an upper class with an elite culture as the Greeks 
did later.25 Under Macedonian rule, the Egyptians found themselves in very 
much the same situation as the Jews but without a stabilized tradition. 
While the Israelite tradition achieved its final state of the Hebrew canon, 
the Egyptian tradition had to undergo profound transformations. Some 
features developed under minority conditions are strikingly similar. The 
extreme stress laid on purity, laws, life form, and diet in many ways parallel 
the emergence of halakha in Israel. We also find the belief in the untranslat- 
ability of the Egyptian language.
Hellenized Egyptians were as active in producing Greek texts as hel- 
lenized Jews. Quite a few of these texts present themselves as translations 
from the Egyptian. Translation and interpretation were central among the 
cultural activities of Greco-Egyptian and Greco-Jewish intellectuals in the 
literate milieus of Alexandria and Memphis.26 The question of translation 
and translatability itself became a major topic in this literature.27 But there 
is also a theory of untranslatability that rejects even the principle and prac­
tice of translating gods. In Iamblichus (De mysteriis 2.:4—5) we read, for 
example, that names of gods should never be translated.28 In dealing with 
divine names one has to exclude all questions of meaning and reference. 
The name is to be regarded as a mystical symbol. It cannot be understood 
and for this very reason it cannot be translated. Knowledge of the names 
preserves the “mystical image of the deity” in the soul. For this reason we 
prefer to call the sun god not Helios but Baal, Semesilam (Shamash?), or 
Re, and the god of wisdom not Hermes but rather Thoth. The gods de­
clared the languages of holy peoples like the Assyrians and the Egyptians 
holy, and communication with the gods can only take place in these lan­
guages. The Egyptians and other barbarians “always kept to the same for­
mulas because they are conservative and so are the gods. Their formulas 
are welcome to the gods. To alter them is not permitted to anybody under 
any circumstances.” The Lautgestalt here becomes a taboo, the phonetic 
form of language functioning not as a signifiant which stands for some 
signifie but as a mystical symbol, a kind of verbal image full of mysterious 
beauty and divine presence.
In opposing Celsus’s view on the arbitrariness of divine names, the 
Christian church father Origen uses exactly the same arguments as the pa­
gan magician and philosopher Iamblichus.29 Both agree that there is a nat­
ural link (sympdtheia, “sympathy”) between name and deity and that the 
magical and “presentifying” power of language rests in the sound and not 
in the meaning and is therefore untranslatable. A less well known treat­
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ment of the same topos can be found in the opening chapters of treatise 
XVI from the Corpus Hermeticum. It is presented as introduction to a 
translation and thus deals with both translating and untranslatability.
He said that those who read my books [Hermes Trismegistos speaks] will think 
that they are very clearly and simply written, when in fact, quite the contrary, they 
are unclear and hide the meaning of the words and will become completely obscure 
when later on the Greeks will want to translate our language into their own, which 
will bring about a complete distortion and obfuscation of the text. Expressed in 
the original language, the discourse conveys its meaning clearly, for the very quality 
of the sounds and the [intonation] of the Egyptian words contain in [themselves] 
the force of the things said.
Preserve this discourse untranslated, in order that such mysteries may be kept 
from the Greeks, and that their insolent, insipid and meretricious manner of speech 
may not reduce to impotence the dignity and strength [of our language] and the 
cogent force of the words. For all the Greeks have is empty speech, good for show­
ing off; and the philosophy of the Greeks is just noisy talk. For our part, we use not 
words, but sounds full of energy.30
The energetic theory of language is magical. The magical force of spells 
resides in their sound. It is the sound, the sensual quality of speech, that 
has the power to reach the divine sphere. The energetic dimension of lan­
guage is untranslatable.
Conversion: Revelation Versus Evidence
One of the surest signs that we are dealing with a secondary religion is the 
phenomenon of conversion.31 As long as there is the possibility of transla­
tion there is no need of conversion. If all religions basically worship the 
same gods there is no need to give up one religion and to enter another one. 
This possibility only occurs if there is one religion claiming knowledge of 
a superior truth. It is precisely this claim that excludes translatability. If 
one religion is wrong and the other is right, there can be no question of 
translating the gods of the one into those of the other. Obviously they are 
about different gods.
A very interesting borderline case is provided by the opening scene of 
the eleventh book in the Metamorphoses by Apuleius, in which Lucius 
prays to the rising moon and sees in a dream the goddess herself. The 
speech of the goddess first displays the well-known topos of the relativity 
of names. One people calls her by this name, the other by that name, all 
adoring her in their specific tongues and cultural forms. But beyond all her 
conventional ethnic names there is a verum nomen, her true name, and this 
one is known only to the Egyptians and the Ethiopians. Up till now it made
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little difference whether you worshiped Venus in the way of the Paphians, 
Minerva Cecropeia in the way of the Athenians, Diana in the way of the 
Ephesians, or Proserpina in the way of the Sicilians. But now it turns out 
to be of utmost importance to follow Isis in the way of the Egyptians be­
cause only they know the true name and rites. If you are really serious about 
it, there is no alternative: you must convert to the Isis-religion and enter 
into the group of the initiated.32
But still, Isis is a cosmotheistic deity. She belongs to the class of supreme 
beings who embody the universe in its totality. Her particular power and 
attraction lie in her double role of cosmic deity and personal rescuer; she 
is mistress of the stars and of luck and fate. Being a cosmotheistic deity, her 
name has a rich signifie. Presenting herself she may point to every divine 
role possible as a manifestation of her power. “I am this, and that, and that, 
... in short: everything,” she says to her believers. The god of Israel is the 
exact opposite. He does not say “I am everything” but “I am who I am,” 
negating by this expression every referent, every tertium comparationis, 
and every translatability.33 He is not only above but displaces all the other 
gods. Here, the cosmotheistic link between god and world, and god and 
gods, is categorically broken.
This is what the enlightened and cultured among the pagans were un­
able to understand. It was not a problem that the Jews were monotheists: 
monotheism had long been established as the leading philosophical atti­
tude toward the divine. Every cultivated person agreed that there is but one 
god and it little mattered whether his name was Adonai or Zeus or Ammon 
or whether he was just called Hypsistos (Supreme). This is the point Celsus 
made in his Alethes Logos. The name is “Schall und Rauch,” as Goethe, 
another cosmotheist, put it. Varro (116—27 b.c.e.), who knew about the 
Jews from Poseidonios, was unwilling to make any difference between Jove 
and Jahve nihil interesse censens quo nomine nuncupetur, dum eadem res 
intelligatur,34 But the Jews and the Christians insisted on the very name. 
For them, the name mattered. To translate Adonai into Zeus would have 
meant apostasy.
The translatability of gods depended on their natural evidence. They 
are accessible either to experience or to reason or to both in the form of 
indubitable, intersubjective, and intercultural data to which one can point 
in searching for a name in another language. What this form of natural 
evidence excludes is “belief”: where all is “given” there is nothing to be­
lieve in. The worship of gods is a matter of knowledge and obedience but 
not of belief. In his book Belief, Language and Experience, the philosopher 
and indologist Rodney Needham has shown that most languages lack a
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word for what in the Greek of the New Testament is called pistis and what 
other languages translate as fides, Glaube, foi and so on; in English pistis 
is rendered by two words: faith and belief. Christian missionaries had great 
trouble finding words for pistis in the languages of the people they wanted 
to address.35 In most cases they had to invent a word. Translatability rests 
upon experience and reason, untranslatability on belief which in itself 
proves to be an untranslatable concept. Paul already made the difference 
quite clear by stating “we are walking not by the sight (opsis) but by the 
faith (pistis)” (2 Cor 5.7). People walking “by the sight” could point to the 
visible world in telling which gods they worshiped. People walking by faith 
had to tell a story the truth of which rests on matters outside the visible 
world. They could translate the story but not the god.
Syncretism: Translation into a Third Language
In a recent book, G. W. Bowersock has proposed that Hellenism was a me­
dium rather than a message. Hellenism provided a common language for 
local traditions and religions to express themselves in a voice much more 
eloquent, flexible, and articulate than their own. “Greek,” Bowersock 
writes, “was the language and culture of transmission and communication. 
It served, in other words, as a vehicle.”36 Hellenism did not mean helleni- 
zation. It did not cover the variegated world of different peoples and cul­
tures, religions and traditions, with a unified varnish of Greek culture. Hel­
lenism, instead, provided them with “a flexible medium of both cultural 
and religious expressions.” Bowersock is perhaps somewhat underrating 
the strong anti-Greek feelings prevailing among the native elites, especially 
in Judaea and Egypt,37 and the frequent clashes and tensions between in­
digenous traditions and the world of the gymnasium. But he is certainly 
right in pointing out that the culture of late antiquity owed at least as much 
to indigenous influences as to the Greek heritage and that the Greek uni­
verse of language, thought, mythology, and imagery became less an alter­
native or even antithesis to local traditions than a new way of giving voice 
to them. This explains why from the Jewish and Christian points of view 
the differences between Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Syrian, Babylonian, and 
other religions disappeared. “Hellenism” became a synonym for “pagan­
ism,” because it served in late antiquity as a common semiotic system and 
practice for all these religions. As they were translated into the common 
semiotic system of Hellenism, the borders between the different traditions 
tended to become much more permeable than they had been within the 
original language barriers. A process of interpenetration took place which
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not only for Jews and Christians but also for the “pagans” themselves made 
the differences between them much less evident than what they had in com­
mon. Hellenism, in other words, not only provided a common language 
but helped to discover a common world and a “cosmopolitan” conscious­
ness.
Nineteenth-century scholars used to refer to this process of cultural and 
religious interpenetration as “syncretism.”38 The Greek term synkretismos 
occurs only once: in Plutarch, where it refers to an archaic custom of the 
Cretan people to overcome local feuds and to form a sacred alliance to 
withstand foreign aggression. By way of an erroneous association with 
kerannymi (to merge), which would yield synkrasi'a, the expression came 
to denote the idea of a merging of gods (tbeokrasia) and then of cultures 
in a more general sense. But syncretism, as opposed to “fusion,” is not sim­
ply merging. It describes a kind of merging which coexists with the original 
distinct entities. The local identities are not altogether abolished; they are 
only made transparent, as it were. They retain their native semiotic prac­
tices and preserve their original meaning. When translated into the third 
language of Hellenism, however, they assume a new kind of transparency 
which smoothes down idiosyncratic differences, allows for interpenetra­
tion, and opens up a common background of “cosmotheism.” Syncretism 
requires or offers double membership: one in a native culture and one in a 
general culture. It does not mean one at the expense of the other. The gen­
eral culture depends (or even “feeds”) on the local cultures.
We can distinguish three types of cultural translation: “syncretis- 
tic translation” or translation into a third language/culture; “assimila- 
tory translation” or translation into a dominating language/culture; and 
“mutual translation” within a network of (economic/cultural) exchanges.
Syncretistic translation is exemplified by what may be called “cos- 
motheistic monotheism.” The different divinities are not just “translated” 
into each other but into a third and overarching one which forms some­
thing like a common background. Syncretistic translation renders the com­
mon background visible. It presupposes a fundamental unity beyond all 
cultural diversities. As far as theology is concerned, this unity is guaranteed 
by the oneness of the world. The world or cosmos serves as the ultimate 
referent for the diverse divinities. We may compare the unity of syncretism, 
which is founded on the cosmos, with the unity of anthropology, which 
is founded on “human nature” (“die Einheit des Menschengeistes,” as 
Thomas Mann called it).
Assimilatory or competitive translation is exemplified by the early in­
stances of interpretatio Graeca, when Herodotus visited Egypt and formed
Translating Gods 35
the opinion that “almost all the names of the gods came from Egypt to 
Greece.” This, he adds, is what the Egyptians say themselves. What He­
rodotus heard in conversing with Egyptian priests must have been the 
Greek names. They spoke to him in Greek using the hellenized names of 
the gods, speaking not of Re, Amun, Thoth, and Ptah, but of Helios, Zeus, 
Hermes, and Hephaestus.39 For them, it did not matter whether these gods 
were called Re or Helios, Amun or Zeus, Thoth or Hermes, as long as the 
same gods were recognized and addressed by these names. They claimed 
to have been the first to recognize these gods, to find out their nature by 
establishing their mythology and theology, and to establish a permanent 
contact with them: gnosis theon, as this particular cultural activity is 
called.40 The interpretatio Graeca of the Egyptian gods thus turns out to 
be not a Greek but an Egyptian achievement. We have always assumed this 
translation to be a manifestation of the Greek spirit and its interpretive 
openness toward foreign civilizations. But it seems now much more prob­
able that the translation of their national panthea into Greek suited in the 
first place the interest of the “barbarians.” Morton Smith and others have 
shown that Greek language and learning tended already to be recognized 
and experienced as an elite or superior culture by oriental peoples under 
the Persian empire and long before the Macedonian conquest.41 All the 
stories about early Greek encounters with Egyptian priests, from Solon and 
Hekataios down to Herodotus and Platon, show the same Egyptian ten­
dency to impress the Greek visitors by their superior cultural antiquity.42 
What you call culture—the argument runs—and what you are so proud of 
has been familiar to us for thousands of years and it is from us that your 
ancestors borrowed it. This is a very familiar motif in “nativistic” move­
ments of our days. Where western culture is met by primitive cultures, this 
is a typical reaction.43 Greek functions in this context as the other, not as 
a third language. Translatability into Greek is a question of cultural com­
petitiveness.
Mutual translation seems to apply to the Babylonian material. This 
type of mutual translation is based on and develops within networks of 
international law and commerce. The history of these networks leads us 
back to the very roots both of translation and of mutuality or reciprocity, 
namely, to the exchange of gifts as the primal form of intergroup com­
munication. Marcel Mauss, in his classic study on “le don,”44 was the first 
to point out the communicative functions of what Marshall Sahlins later 
called “Stone Age economics.”45 The basic function of exchange is not the 
fulfillment of economic needs but the establishment of community by com­
munication, mutuality, and reciprocity. It is therefore anything but a sur­
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prise that mutual translation turns out to be the earliest type and some­
thing like the “primal scene” of cultural translatability. Translate! is the 
categorical imperative of early cultures. It is the overcoming of autistic se­
clusion, the prohibition of incest, the constraint to form alliances outside 
the narrow circles of house, village, and clan, and to enter into larger net­
works of communication.
It is revealing to translate these three types into our time. To start with 
the last one, mutual translation: Today, when these networks have finally 
become global, they have lost something of their primary charm. The mod­
ern situation is characterized by a strange kind of reciprocity: on the one 
hand, western civilization is expanding all over the world; there is hardly 
any place left untouched by Coca-Cola. On the other hand, cultural frag­
ments from all places and periods are brought into the musee imaginaire 
of western culture, which is rapidly growing into a supermarket or Dis­
neyland of postmodern curiosity. In pre- and early historical times, reci­
procity and mutuality meant a process of growth and enrichment for all 
cultures involved; today it means loss and impoverishment. Western cul­
ture is reduced to Coca-Cola and pidgin English, native cultures are re­
duced to airport art. The cultural imperative, today, points in the opposite 
direction: to regionalism, the preservation (or invention) of dying lan­
guages and traditions, and the emphasis on otherness. This is also why as- 
similatory translation or competitive otherness is no longer a valid option. 
Mutual acknowledgment is suppressed as one culture is used as the neg­
ative foil of the other.
There remains the first type to be considered, syncretism as defined in 
terms of double membership and a third language. Such a language is 
something not actually given but virtually envisaged and kept up in order 
to provide a framework in which individual cultures can become trans­
parent without losing their identities.
Hellenism, seen not as a message but as a medium, not as a homoge­
nizing cover but as a flexible and eloquent language giving understandable 
voice to vastly different messages, preserving difference while providing 
transparency, might serve as a model. Hellenistic culture became a medium 
equally removed from classical Greek culture as from all the other oriental 
and African cultures that adopted it as a form of cultural self-expression. 
In the same way, a transcultural medium that will not amount to western­
ization or Americanization could provide visibility and transparency in a 
world of preserved traditions and cultural otherness.
